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Abstract The study tested a hypothesis, based on the cog-
nitive dissonance theory, that not only stimulus and re-
sponse conflicts, as studied to date on the grounds of the
influential conflict monitoring theory of human self-con-
trol, but also semantic incompatibility between complex
cognitive representations, can mobilize such self-control.
In two experiments, we applied a realistic task (simulated
web feed), and manipulated the amount of semantic con-
flict (contradictory text messages), as well as the amount of
tempting distractors (jokes and erotic pictures) that were
supposed to be ignored. Experiment 1 demonstrated that
semantic conflict mobilized self-control, as evidenced by
participants better ignoring distraction. Experiment 2
showed that semantic conflict yielded the self-control de-
pletion effect, analogous to the effects caused by a
prolonged resistance to distraction, most probably because
it mobilized self-control. The results extend the conflict
monitoring theory, by implying that the detection of cog-
nitive dissonance between incoming messages can also
serve to regulate the strength of self-control.
Keywords Semantic conflict . Cognitive dissonance .
Self-control .Motivation . Self-control depletion
Introduction
A crucial and, thus, intensively studied human mental faculty
is self-control (also called executive control). Such control
allows humans to initiate, regulate, coordinate, and suppress
their thoughts and actions in a flexible and novel way, in order
to reach adopted long-term goals, particularly in the face of
conflicting stimulation and tempting but inadequate response
tendencies. For instance, facing the choice between preparing
for a boring but important exam and going to a pleasant but
distracting party, most people will require mental effort and
reflection to reject the party, and still some people fail to do so.
The key role of effective self-control for coherent behavior
can be seen when control has been disrupted (e.g., due to
mental overload, tiredness, aging, neurological deficits, etc.),
resulting in no longer being able to inhibit habitual but im-
proper responses, prevent perseveration, overcome distrac-
tion, and organize actions into meaningful sequences
(Banich 2009; Diamond 2013; Norman 1981; Shallice and
Burgess 1993). Those deficits of control may lead to various
personally and socially disruptive behaviors, such as poor
scholastic achievement, procrastination, obesity, addictions,
and violence (see Baumeister and Vohs 2004; Eigste et al.
2006; Malenka et al. 2009; Nigg et al. 2006).
However, even for people who control themselves quite
effectively, strongly controlled, goal-focused processing
seems to be energetically and cognitively costly, and often
counter-effective (especially in highly skilled actions, when
simple, automated strategies might be highly effective;
Bargh et al. 2010). Moreover, strong control makes an agent
focus exclusively on selected goals and actions, while other,
temporarily ignored goals may become potentially more valu-
able but strong control may either prevent them from being
attempted (Inzlicht et al. 2014) or make switching to them
very difficult (Dang et al. 2014). As a result, for optimal
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behavior, an agent should strongly control her- or himself only
when it is really necessary to correctly perform a task (usually
novel, demanding, and important one), while exerting little
self-control otherwise (the minimum control principle;
Taatgen 2007). However, this results in a paradox: how can
agents know when to apply strong but costly control, tightly
focusing on goal-relevant processes, and when to withdraw
them, relying on well-learned and thus less effortful behavior-
al schemata, without constantly Bcontrolling^ their own self-
control over behavior?
One solution to this paradox assumes that an agent mon-
itors a simple global signal (simple enough not to require
any complex processing), serving as a heuristic for deciding
whether strong control is needed in a particular situation.
Berlyne (1960) proposed that this signal may rely on re-
sponse conflict present between potential actions, and
strong conflict may drive organisms into particular
actions. In their influential conflict monitoring theory,
Botvinick et al. (2001) revived this approach, asking three
interrelated questions: When should control start to regulate
the response choice? How strongly should control regulate
such a choice? When should control over the response
choice be withdrawn? Botvinick et al. proposed that the
control system (located at the anterior cingulate cortex;
ACC) constantly monitors possible conflicts among poten-
tial responses, and resolves each conflict by enhancing the
goal-relevant responses with the strength proportional to
the conflict level. If the engagement of control eventually
resolves the conflict, the strength of its intervention can be
(gradually) decreased. Numerous studies supported predic-
tions of the conflict monitoring theory (see Niendam et al.
2012). Although some other models have been proposed
which assume that ACC, instead of responding to conflicts,
learns by reinforcement errors (Holroyd and Coles 2002),
risks (Brown and Braver 2007), or unexpected outcomes
(Alexander and Brown 2011) that suggest a given situation
requires high control (so that the required strength of con-
trol could be predicted in the future), the cross-model em-
pirical tests (e.g., Yeung and Nieuwenhuis 2009) seem to
support the conflict monitoring theory to a large extent. So,
conflict monitoring remains a major theoretical account of
how control is recruited and withdrawn, especially when it
is supplemented with some specialized reinforcement
learning mechanisms (see Chuderski and Smolen 2016;
Verguts and Notebaert 2008).
However, there are two crucial issues that pertain to
existing research supporting the conflict monitoring theory,
which make it extremely difficult to generalize the predictions
of this theory onto more complex and socially meaningful
situations, beyond simple laboratory settings. Thus, it remains
unclear whether, in more realistic, daily-life situations, the
detection of conflicts indeed makes people control themselves
more strongly.
First, virtually all of the tests of this theory were based on
simplified stimulus-response tasks, such as the Stroop task
and its variants (MacLeod 1991). For example, the flanker
task requires responding to the direction of an arrow
surrounded by other arrows pointing in the opposite direction.
The color-word task consists of colored words that themselves
name colors, and requires participants to run a less-learned
process of naming colors, while suppressing a well-learned,
and thus automatically activated, process of reading color
names. The crucial finding in the Stroop paradigm, called
the congruency effect, consists of increased response latency
for incongruent stimuli (e.g., word Bblue^ presented in green),
compared to congruent stimuli (e.g., Bblue^ in blue).
Indeed, numerous studies have shown that the congruency
effect decreases when the imposed conflict level increases.
For example, the effect decreases in sequences in which more
incongruent stimuli are presented than congruent stimuli, in
comparison to sequences that contain primarily congruent
stimuli (Tzelgov et al. 1992). This observation was explained
by Botvinick et al. (2001) as based on the mechanism of the
conflict-driven mobilization of control (the increase in its
strength), resulting from an overall higher level of conflict in
the primarily incongruent sequences, compared to sequences
that include more congruent than incongruent trials.
Although allowing strict experimental control, simplified
tasks like Stroop have low ecological validity. In daily life,
people do not need to name colors of colored words, or decide
about directions of incompatible arrows. Furthermore, hun-
dreds of trials of such tasks, commonly applied during an
experiment, are extremely boring to participants, and the re-
spective conflicts are pretty straightforward (e.g., the arrows
point to either one or two directions). It is not certain whether
people easily detect conflicts in a similar manner in more
natural, complex settings, when many interesting events may
divert their attention from the source of conflict (e.g., when
interacting with emotionally or socially meaningful stimuli),
and when the conflict is much harder to notice.
Second, but linked to the previous point, to date, virtually
all studies related to the conflict monitoring theory pertained
solely to conflicts among response tendencies, usually either
simple vocalizations, such as saying a color/picture name, or
manual actions, such as pressing a button or squeezing a dy-
namometer. However, since its very beginnings, psychologi-
cal research has focused on conflicts beyond simple
responding. For example, Kurt Lewin (1935) was one of the
first scholars to investigate the conflicts between so called
helping and hindering forces (e.g., personal and situational
variables) that acted on a person, moving that person either
toward or away from the adopted goal. That inspired Lewin’s
student, Leo Festinger (1957), to investigate conflicts between
mental representations (in his terminology: cognitions), such
as attitudes, opinions, or decisions, and to formalize the level
of conflict between consonant (i.e., goal-relevant) and
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dissonant (i.e., goal-irrelevant) cognitions on the grounds of
his seminal cognitive dissonance theory. According to
Festinger, the level of conflict equals the weighted ratio of
dissonances to the sum of all dissonances and consonances
that are meaningful for a given situation (Festinger and
Carlsmith 1959). Festinger predicted that motivation to coun-
teract dissonance depends on the conflict level when
expressed in this way. This prediction has been corroborated
by Elliot and Devine (1994; for other studies supporting the
cognitive dissonance theory see Cooper, 2007).
In the modern parlance of self-control research, such an
increase in motivation can be referred to as the increased
strength of self-control, or of executive control (Botvinick
and Braver 2015). However, there were few studies that ex-
amined the influence of semantic conflict, which was under-
stood as cognitive dissonance that resulted from the contradic-
tory meaning of mental representations, on the strength of
exerted control. It is clear that Stroop tasks, especially
picture-word tasks (Glaser and Glaser 1982; La Heij and van
den Hof 1995), yield some semantic conflict (e.g., a picture
and a word mean different things), but (a) its nature is very
simple in relation to that of cognitive dissonance (where two
messages or beliefs mean the precisely opposite things), and
(b) its behavioral effects can solely be explained in terms of
memory retrieval (see Van Maanen et al. 2009) or response
selection (see Chuderski and Smolen 2016). The latter possi-
bility is indicated by the substantial response-set effects (i.e., a
meaning not associated with a response yields minimal
conflict; Proctor 1978). Two studies examined effects of more
complex forms of semantic incompatibility. Van Veen et al.
(2009) demonstrated that increased activation of the ACC
accompanies the detection of cognitive dissonance between
an attitude held by a participant and the contrasting
argumentation provided, and predicts the respective attitude
change. Kan et al. (2013) showed that presenting ambiguous
sentences, whose initial interpretation might differ from the
final (correct) interpretation, increases the strength of control
(decreases response latency) in the subsequent incongruent
trial of the color-word Stroop task. However, evidence show-
ing that the incompatibility between the meaning of cognitive
representations processed by an agent (possibly yielding cog-
nitive dissonance) can affect the self-controlling behavior of
that agent (e.g., can increase focus on task, or decrease the
distractor proneness) is still insufficient.
Consequently, our aim was to examine predictions of the
conflict monitoring theory (a) in a more Brealistic^ task than
the laboratory tests applied to date (b) that would impose
semantic conflicts comparable to cognitive dissonances, that
is, when twomutually contradictory pieces of information had
to be processed. In particular, we predicted that semantic con-
flicts introduced in our realistic task would be effectively de-
tected by participants, and that these conflicts would mobilize
self-control, as evidenced by the higher rate of picking target
stimuli out of distractors when semantic conflict would be
present, compared to when it would be absent.
Experiment 1
Participants
A total of 46 women and 36 men participated (82 people).
They were recruited via adverts on social networking
webpages. Mean age was 22.8 years (SD = 3.38, range 18–
38). Each participant received the equivalent of ten euros in
local currency. Each person was informed that participation is
voluntary, and that they can leave the lab at will. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Experimental Design
One challenge for an experimental study of self-control that
aims to be carried out in a more natural setting is the design of
a realistic task that, on one hand, can be applied using a com-
puter, and requires relatively simple and well-measurable re-
sponses, whereas, on the other hand, still resembles activities
that most people do on an everyday basis at their work or
home. Our choice was a tool that requires both searching
and reading short portions of information within a simplified
web feed, in order to fulfill a task of gathering as much rele-
vant knowledge on a given (realistic) problem as possible,
and, then, answering one question regarding that problem.
The task was difficult, as the target information was always
accompanied by some distracting, task-irrelevant content. The
two crucial manipulations in the task consisted of (a) increas-
ing the amount of distracting information that accompanied
the target information, and (b) introducing semantic incom-
patibility within the target information (some texts negated
others).
Each participant dealt with four problems. In each problem,
the screen was composed of a 3 × 3 matrix filled with textual
or graphical portions of information (messages). The initial
screen consisted of nine messages, one message per one ma-
trix cell. Every 5 s (per cycle) one random message was
substituted with another message. In total, 100 messages were
presented in one problem (including the initial ones). The four
problems were formulated as follows: BOn the basis of the
information provided, please…^:
(a) judge the probability that IT company X will increase its
headcount in the following year;
(b) describe how the human cortex works;
(c) explain how a computer processor works;
(d) evaluate what factors have the key role in supporting the
existing political system in Ukraine.
136 Curr Psychol (2019) 38:134–144
Importantly, in order to be maximally interesting for par-
ticipants, the problems pertained to diverse topics. It was also
important that the problems pertained to concrete objects or
situations because, when more abstract problems where used
in an analogous pilot study, the effects of semantic incompat-
ibility were strongly decreased, probably because such incom-
patibility could not easily be detected.
Messages belonged to three categories. Target messages
were short texts (but not shorter than 120 characters) provid-
ing information relevant for a problem to be solved. For in-
stance, a target message could state that BCompany X expects
more sales next year and thus increases marketing costs…^.
However, some target messages were what we will call con-
flicting messages. Each such message was presented from two
to five cycles after the corresponding target message, and
contained a similar text to the latter message, except for the
fact that its meaning was exactly opposite. For example, if the
preceding target message stated that BCompany X expects
more sales next year and thus increases marketing costs…^,
then the conflicting message would say: BCompany X expects
less sales next year and will cut marketing costs…^. If one
message in such a pair contained negation, it was presented as
either the first or second, at random.
Another category was distractor messages, which consisted
of three subtypes. Fake messages (30% of distractor mes-
sages) conveyed information superficially associated with a
problem, but in fact irrelevant for it (e.g., BThe employees of
company X won the soccer cup in the 2013 sales departments
competition…^). The remaining distractor messages (images)
were either attractive graphics (30%, funny cartoons and erot-
ic images) or text jokes (40%). Distractor messages were
intended to capture participants’ attention. We assumed that
the high proportion of distractor messages within a particular
problem should result in participants missing the target mes-
sages more often, compared to the low proportion. Since the
target messages disappeared from the screen after 22.5 s on
average (i.e., from 10 to 45 s, depending on the number of
cycles that each message was displayed for), the prolonged
focus of attention on attractive, pleasant, but totally irrelevant
distractor messages/images increased the chance that the in-
coming target message would disappear from the screen be-
fore attention was switched to that message.
The last category was noise messages, which conveyed
either text information irrelevant for the problem, but in no
way conflicting with the target messages (e.g., BSeveral na-
tional parks have been founded in Poland recently …^), or
images of supposedly non-distracting natural objects and
landscapes. As the noise messages/images were rather dull
and unattractive, we assumed that they would capture atten-
tion to a much lesser extent than would the distractor mes-
sages/images. The use of both the distractor and noise mes-
sages made the contents of the task relatively similar to inter-
net portals, which usually contain a lot of irrelevant textual
and graphical content that accompanies crucial information.
The example screen of the task, including all types of mes-
sages, is presented in Fig. 1.
Both authors searched available web pages in order to col-
lect erotic pictures, jokes, and noise images. A stimulus was
included into the materials if both authors agreed that it ful-
filled the criteria of a given category. In line with their strict
instructions, the target, conflicting, and distracting messages
were generated by a student, and were included into the ma-
terials only if both authors accepted them.
The task of each participant was to monitor and read mes-
sages that could be potentially informative with regard to the
problem posed. Participants were instructed that they had to
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Fig. 1 A demonstration of a
screen in the realistic task used in
Experiments 1 and 2, with
particular types of messages that
were presented in the task marked
with arrows (note that no arrows
were shown in the original
screens). Texts represent English
translations of the original
messages (in the experiments, the
task was administered in Polish)
confirm that a certain message was a message conveying an
important knowledge on the problem, via pressing the mouse
button on that message. The clickedmessage was marked blue
(regardless of whether it was a correct target message or an
incorrect distractor/noise message, that is, there was no feed-
back on clicking). At the beginning of the experiment, in order
to motivate participants to click on as many relevant messages
as possible, people were informed that, after the sequence of
messages, they would be provided with the messages they
chose, which would help them to answer a question about a
presented problem (e.g., BWhat is the probability that compa-
ny X will increase its profits next year?^). Answering the
question consisted of subjectively judging the respective prob-
ability. The participants were asked to provide as accurate
judgements as possible, and they were not aware that their
answers to the questions would not be evaluated after the
study (in fact, as the problems were fictional, there could be
no correct answers to the questions). However, as the instruc-
tions insisted on the most accurate performance on the mes-
sage collection and further question answering, and the par-
ticipants were told that they would be paid for their Baccurate
performance^ (although eventually each participant was paid
the same amount of money), we had good reasons to believe
that our participants would be trying hard to focus on the task
and mark as many target messages as possible (to ease their
answers), thereby avoiding the distractors and noise.
Two crucial task parameters were the number of conflicting
messages, and the number of distractor messages. In the no-
conflict condition, there were 30 target messages defined for a
particular problem, but no conflicting messages were present-
ed among them. In the conflict condition, out of 30 target
messages, 10 were conflicting messages (i.e., they followed
the target messages which had the meaning opposite to their
own meaning). In the low-distraction condition, there were 10
distractor messages/images. In the high-distraction condition,
as many as 60 distractor messages/images were presented. In
order to obtain the 100-message/image sequences, in the for-
mer condition, 60 noise messages/images were used, while, in
the latter, as few as 10 noise messages/images were included.
For each participant and problem, the distractor and noise
messages/images were sampled randomly without replace-
ment, using a pool of about 1200 distractors and 1500 noise
messages/images. The number of stimuli of each type for each
condition of the task is summarized in Table 1.
The independent variables were semantic conflict (either
present in 10 conflicting messages, or absent when no con-
flicting messages were used), and distraction (either low when
10 distractor messages/images were shown, or high when 60
distractor messages/images were displayed). For each partici-
pant, we applied one problem in each of four possible condi-
tions (no-conflict/low-distraction, no-conflict/high-distrac-
tion, conflict/low-distraction, and conflict/high-distraction),
resulting in a 2 × 2 Bwithin-subjects^ design. Particular prob-
lems and conditions were assigned randomly for each
participant.
We expected that high distraction would decrease perfor-
mance accuracy (i.e., people would be looking more frequent-
ly at fake messages, erotic pictures, and jokes, instead of
selecting the target messages). Crucially, we also expected that
the distraction effect (i.e., the positive error rate difference
between the high-distraction and the low-distraction condi-
tion) would be present in the no-conflict condition, but would
be attenuated by increased control in the conflict condition.
We assumed that people, after detecting semantic conflicts
(i.e., conflicting messages), which were expected to act as a
kind of red alarm, would more effectively ignore distractors
and focus on the task (i.e., they would detect and read target
messages more carefully). Such an effect might indicate that
the control system could be mobilized by increased semantic
conflict, and, as a result, distraction could be more effectively
rejected.
Procedure and Scoring
Groups of several people were tested using the above men-
tioned task for roughly one hour. Testing took place in a large,
dimly lit room. Standard PC workstations were used. Each
participant occupied a visually isolated desk, and was asked
to adopt the most comfortable sitting position.
Table 1 Number of stimuli of




Messages Low distraction High distraction Low distraction High distraction
Target messages 30 30 20 20
Conflicting messages 0 0 10 10
Distractor messages/images 10 60 10 60
Noise messages/images 60 10 60 10
Total number of messages/images 100 100 100 100
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The dependent variable (DV) approximated d’ statistics of
the signal detection theory, and was calculated, for each prob-
lem, as the proportion of missed target messages (i.e., reversed
rate of hits; ERR), increased by the weighted proportion of
incorrectly marked distractor and noise messages/images (i.e.,
the rate of false alarms, FA). The conflicting messages were
excluded from the DV calculation, as they were only intended
to elicit conflict, and because they were more often missed
(M = .46) than were the target messages (M = .31). The weight
used reflected the ratio of target messages (either 20 or 30, in
the conflict or the no-conflict condition, respectively) to the
sum of distractor and noise messages (70). Specifically, DV
equaled ERR +0.286 FA in the conflict condition, and ERR
+0.429 FA in the no-conflict condition. This correction of
participants’ decisional bias was meant to account for the in-
dividual response tendencies, as people who generally tended
to respond more often (i.e., had lower response threshold and
thus more frequently responded on random) also had a larger
chance of hitting the target (see Snodgrass and Corwin 1988).
The specific weight indicated the probability of a participant
marking the target message by chance when clicking mes-
sages at random, as indicated by their FA. In the remainder
of the text, we refer to our corrected error rate simply as error
rate. Participants only received the overall accuracy feedback
at the end of each problem, by obtaining information on the
number of correctly marked target messages (which were
listed, in order to ease the answer to the question). Since,
due to the multichannel form of information presentation,
we were not able to control the moment at which participants
started attending to a given message/image, we did not ana-
lyze response times.
We tested the influence of our two factors (distraction: high
or low, and conflict: present or absent), as well as their inter-
active effect on DV, in one statistical model submitted to
ANOVA.
Results and Discussion
Themean error rate was .33 (SD = .11). It ranged fromM = .15
to M = .64 for particular participants, suggesting that they
followed instructions for the task. The mean error rates and
their 95% confidence intervals for all experimental conditions
are presented in Fig. 2.
Both factors yielded significant main effects in ANOVA.
First, in the high-distraction condition, the error rate was
higher (M = .39) than in the low-distraction condition
(M = .28), F(1, 81) = 55.59, p < .001, η2 = .41. This fact
implied that fakemessages, erotic images, and funny cartoons,
originally aimed at capturing people’s attention, indeed
diverted participants from fulfilling the task, and constituted
a substantial source of distraction for the control system.
Second, there was no significant difference in error rate be-
tween the conflict and no-conflict conditions, F(1, 81) = 0.12,
meaning that conflict did not affect the accuracy of the target
messages detection per se.
The most important effect was the two-way interaction of
investigated factors (see Fig. 2), which was significant F(1,
81) = 15.24, p < .001, and substantial, η2 = .94. Tukey’s HSD
test showed that there was a significant difference between the
high- and the low-distraction condition both in the no-conflict
(p < .001) and the conflict (p = .008) condition, however, the
conflict condition yielded a substantially smaller distraction
effect (ΔM = .05) than the no-conflict condition
(ΔM = .16). Thus, it can be concluded that, in concord with
our hypothesis, the introduction of semantic conflicts most
likely seemed to mobilize control over distractors.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed to further validate the conclusion reached
in Experiment 1, by observing the potential effects that the
supposedly mobilized self-control (due to semantic conflicts)
can have on the human ability to exert further control. Our
examination was rooted in numerous studies which suggested
that, after prolonged recruitment of control (like ignoring in-
trusive thoughts, temptations, and distractors), the ability to
exert self-control becomes temporarily depleted (Muraven
and Baumeister 2000; Muraven et al. 1998; for a
comprehensive review see Hagger et al. 2010). Although the
evidence for such self-control depletion have recently been
questioned (Carter et al. 2015; Carter and McCullough
2014; Xu et al. 2014), other studies proposed that self-
control may indeed become released with elapsing time, due
to shifts in motivation (Inzlicht et al. 2014), or because of
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Fig. 2 Mean rate of target message omission, corrected for false alarms
(i.e., error rate), in the conflict versus the no-conflict condition, for the
low- (dashed line) versus the high-distraction (solid line) condition. Bars
represent 95% confidence intervals
drops in the subjective value of self-control, while the
pleasure/leisure value increases (Kool and Botvinick 2014;
Shenhav et al. 2014). Thus, given that strong self-control in
one task often yields some depleting effect on performance in
another task (Hagger et al. 2010), regardless of the underlying
mechanisms, in Experiment 2, we expected that the introduc-
tion of substantial semantic conflict into our realistic task
would decrease participants’ performance on a subsequent
attention control test (the antisaccade task), compared to a
control group, in which participants would face negligible
semantic conflict. This would be another way to demonstrate
that semantic conflicts can mobilize the control system—via
depletion/demotivation effects which can result from such a
mobilization.
Participants
A total of 110 women and 55 men participated (165 people).
Eight participants were removed from the antisaccade task
data analysis due to their below chance level performance on
the task. In total, 4.8% of the sample was discarded due to the
floor effect. The recruitment and gratification were the same
as in Experiment 1. Mean age was 23.28 years (SD = 4.79,
range 18–46). The participants were randomly assigned to one
of three study groups in the order in which they appeared in
the experiment: the control group (N = 46), the high-conflict
group (N = 51), and the high-distraction group (N = 60).
Experimental Design and Procedure
We used the same realistic task as in Experiment 1, with the
following modifications. First, in order to make sure that the
results would not depend on the four selected problems, the
pool of problems now included as many as 16 problems
(which, like in Experiment 1, each included 100 messages).
We used the four problems fromExperiment 1, plus the twelve
listed below:
1. explain how the human brain/vision/body or computer/
drainage/Krakow drainage system works
2. analyze a new investment of IT company X in a mobile
phone system;
3. evaluate the prospects of ITcompany X in light of the new
investment in a mobile phone system;
4. evaluate financial prospects of the IT company X in the
coming year;
5. evaluate what factors have the most important role in de-
termining the EU policy towards Ukraine;
6. evaluate the EU policy towards Moldova;
7. approximate the chances that the Moldovan political sys-
tem will change in the near future.
Second, there were three variants of the task depending on
group. The control group was presented with four problems
randomly drawn from the pool of problems. As in Experiment
1, two problems included a low number (10) of distractor
messages/images (and 60 noise messages/images), and two,
a high number (60) of distractor messages/images (and 10
noise messages/images). As in Experiment 1, the difference
in error rate between the high- and low-distraction conditions
indexed the distraction effect. Each problem also included 26
target messages, and 4 conflicting messages. The latter con-
stituted very low semantic conflict. The high-distraction group
received a task variant with twice as many problems as did the
control group (i.e., four in the low- and four in the high-
distraction condition). This meant that twice as many to-be-
rejected distractors were presented to this group, compared to
the control group. In order to equate the total number (16) of
conflicting messages in the high-distraction and the control
group, each problem in the former group contained only two
such messages (as well as 28 target messages). All other task
parameters were the same as in the control group. Crucially, in
the high-conflict group, the task variant with four problems
was applied, however, each problem included as many as 10
conflicting messages (and 20 target messages). That was an
increase of semantic conflict by 150% in comparison to the
two remaining groups. All other task parameters were the
same as in the control group. The numbers of problems and
the numbers of each type of message per problem are present-
ed in Table 2. DV for the realistic task was calculated identi-
cally as in Experiment 1.
The self-control depletion effect was quantified by a well-
established attention control test, the antisaccade task (Hallett
1978). The task requires making fast eye movements away
from a distractor. We applied the task just before (pretest)
and just after (posttest) the realistic task. Each task adminis-
tration consisted of 40 self-paced trials. Each trial consisted of
four events. First, a cue was presented for 1.5 s to prompt
Table 2 Number and type of




Number of distractor messages/images Number of conflicting messages
Group On average per problem Total Per problem Total
Control 4 35 140 4 16
High-distraction 8 35 280 2 16
High-conflict 4 35 140 10 40
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subjects to look at the side opposite to a rapidly flashing black
square. Next, a fixation point was presented in the center of
the screen for 1–2 s. Then, the flashing square was shown in
the middle of the left or right side of the screen, about 16 cm
from the fixation point, for 0.15 s. Finally, a small dark gray
letter (in pretest) or arrow (in posttest) was presented in the
middle of the opposite side of the screen to the square for only
0.2 s before being replaced by a mask. The task was to look
away from the flashing square, in order to detect the direction
of the arrow or the identity of the letter, and to press the
associated key. The index of self-control depletion was the
error rate in the post-test minus the error rate in the pre-test.
Although we note that, to date, the antisaccade task has not
been used in depletion studies, it is a very reliable test validly
tapping the strength of executive control, which is commonly
used in cognitive psychology (Unsworth et al. 2011) and in
psychometrics (Shipstead et al. 2014). So, any control deple-
tion effects should be detected by means of this task.
Our hypotheses were the following. First, in the realistic
task we expected a higher error rate in the high-distraction
condition (i.e., that with 60 distractor messages/images) than
in the low-distraction condition (that with 10 distractor mes-
sages/images), matching the results of Experiment 1. This
effect would indicate that increased distraction also diverted
participants’ attention from the target messages in Experiment
2. Second, we assumed that the load on self-control imposed
by the realistic task should be relatively low in the control
group. In contrast, in the high-distraction group, as the task
duration was doubled, and thus it included twice as much
distractors, we expected a larger recruitment of control to be
necessary, and, thus, we predicted a significantly larger deple-
tion index, in comparison to the control group. Most impor-
tantly, we expected that a presumably larger load on self-
control in the high-conflict group would also result in a larger
depletion index, compared to the control group. As these two
latter groups differed only in the number of conflicting mes-
sages, a larger depletion effect found in the high-conflict
group could only be assigned to the increased semantic con-
flict. The latter was our main prediction for Experiment 2. We
had no specific hypothesis on the relation of the depletion
index between the high-distraction and the high-conflict
group.
We note that the Bhigh-distraction^ group differed from the
control and the high-conflict group not only by the doubled
number of distractor messages/images, but also by the dou-
bled duration, thus a larger load on controlled performance in
this group could not be associated solely with the former fac-
tor. However, what was relevant about this group for the cur-
rent study was just a larger load in general (arising either due
to more episodes of distraction inhibition or more time for
control to be active, or both). In short, this group served only
as a baseline depletion group, in which a Bstandard^ depletion
effect was expected to occur. Such an effect would validate
our procedure as being comparable to existing studies which
induced depletion effects by imposing larger distraction to be
resisted/rejected (see Hagger et al. 2010).
Results and Discussion
The error rates for the pretest, the realistic task, and the post-
test, for the respective groups, are presented in Table 3. First,
we submitted error rate in the realistic task to ANOVA, with
three levels of the group factor (the control, high-distraction,
and high-control groups) and two levels of the distraction
factor (low vs. high). The main effect of the latter factor was
highly significant, F(1, 324) = 84.6, p < .001, η2 = .20, indi-
cating an increase in error rate of ΔM = .13 from the low- to
the high-distraction condition. The group factor also yielded a
significant difference, F(2, 324) = 9.15, p < .001, η2 = .04,
indicating that error rate in the high-conflict group was higher
by ΔM = .07 compared to the high-distraction group, F(1,
324) = 18.25, p < .001. There was no significant interactive
effect of the group and the distraction, p = .41. Although this
latter result of Experiment 2 does not match the finding of
Experiment 1, the discrepancy between both experiments is
difficult to interpret, because both experiments differed in de-
sign (between- vs. within-subjects, respectively).
Most importantly, we submitted the posttest error rate in the
antisaccade task to ANCOVA, again with three groups as the
factor, and the pretest error rate as the covariate (the latter in
order to account for a visible difference in the pretest perfor-
mance between the groups). There was a significantly larger
depletion effect for both the high-distraction and the high-
control group, in comparison to the control group, F(2,
153) = 3.70, p = .027, η2 = .02. Error rate in the posttest,
corrected by using the pretest error rate, was higher by
ΔM = .044 in the high-conflict group, F(1, 153) = 3.06,
p = .041, and by ΔM = .063 in the high distraction group,
F(1, 153) = 4.34, p = .019 (both contrasts one-tailed, as direc-
tional hypotheses assuming larger depletion were tested), in
comparison to the control group. As suggested by a reviewer,
we ran alternative analysis with difference between post-test
and pre-test in the antisaccade task as dependent variable, and
the error rate in the realistic task as the covariate. Both the
Table 3 Mean error rate (and SD) in the pre-test, realistic task, and
post-test in Experiment 2
Group: Control High-distraction High-conflict
Antisaccade pre-test .18 (.18) .19 (.15) .14 (.15)
Low-distraction condition .28 (.13) .27 (.10) .32 (.14)
High-distraction condition .42 (.13) .37 (.13) .46 (.12)
Antisaccade post-test .14 (.14) .21 (.21) .16 (.15)
N = 165 for the realistic task. N = 157 for the antisaccade task
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main effect of group factor, F(2, 153) = 3.36, p = .037,
η2 = 0.42, and the respective contrasts for the high-conflict,
F(1, 153), p = .032, and the high-conflict distraction group,
F(1, 153), p = .036 (both one-tailed), matched the results of
the preceding ANCOVA. Given that the average error rate in
the antisaccade task wasM = .182, the relative depletion effect
for both the high-conflict and the high-distraction group
amounted a substantial value of the quarter of total errors.
However, as indicated by values of Cohen’s d = .42 and
d = .48, respectively, the observed strength of the depletion
effect was only moderate, and in line with the estimates pro-
vided by Carter andMcCullough (2014). Figure 3 presents the
relative change in the antisaccade error rate between the pre-
and posttest, for consecutive groups.
Conclusion
We tested the hypothesis that increased perception of semantic
conflict affects the exerted strength of self-control. Using a
novel, realistic task that resembled web feeds commonly used
by people at home and work, Experiment 1 showed that in-
troducing semantic conflict, evoked by placing the mutually
contradictory messages within the stream of information
shown to participants, mobilized their self-control, allowing
them to deal more effectively with distractors. Experiment 2
verified, with the same task, that a permanently increased level
of semantic conflict (most probably resulting in permanently
increased control strength) yielded comparable depletion
effects as did the need to reject tempting distractors. Thus,
both experiments confirmed the hypothesis posed.
The present study suggests that the predictions of the con-
flict monitoring theory, originally pertaining to response con-
flicts, can be generalized beyond their original realm, onto
more complex and higher-level conflicts pertaining to pro-
cessing of semantically incompatible messages, as
(indirectly) predicted by the cognitive dissonance theory pro-
posed by Festinger (1957). This finding extends the central
assumption of the conflict monitoring theory, which claims
that the brain constantly evaluates conflicts within the infor-
mation stream, and regulates the self-control strength accord-
ingly. As such, our data seem to strengthen the psychological
plausibility of this theory, showing that it predicts human self-
controlling behavior not only in laboratories, but also in ev-
eryday, socially meaningful situations.
Overall, the study demonstrated that the crucial effect of
cognitive dissonance on motivation, to date supported by the
myriad of studies originating from the Festinger theory (see
Cooper 2007), can also be applied to the much more recent
theorizing on self-control. It seems that the intensity of both
motivation and self-control is similarly affected by the seman-
tic conflict between cognitive representations. Such conflict
may act as a red alarm, informing the human mind that some-
thing is going wrong with its information processing and/or its
environment, and that more careful, as well as task-focused,
behavior is required. This fact also suggests, in line with re-
cent proposals (e.g., Botvinick and Braver 2015; Inzlicht et al.
2014), that self-control and motivation may be more strongly
intertwined than it was supposed earlier. However the nature
of their interaction remains to be discovered in future research.
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Fig. 3 Mean change in the error rate from the pretest to the posttest of the
antisaccade task, for the control, high-distraction, and high-conflict
group. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Note that because of
some practice effect present in the control group (the drop in error rate
in the post-test by .03), the two experimental groups should be compared
to the control group, not to the zero line
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